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SURVEY OF ARTICLES I - VII
OF THE PROPOSED DRAFT
FOR A REVISED SOUTH CAROLINA
CONSTITUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
In June, 1969, the Committee to Make a Study of the South
Carolina Constitution of 1895 submitted its final report to the
Governor and General Assembly. Included in that report was a
proposed new state constitution. The purpose of this paper is to
point out the significant changes in the present constitution
should the first seven articles of the proposed seventeen article
constitution be adopted. It is anticipated that a later paper will
present a similar treatment of the remaining articles. This pres-
ent survey does not attempt to evaluate the desirability of the
Committee's proposals; rather, it merely places them in per-
spective with the provisions of the present constitution in order
to illustrate the changes and problems they would or might
create.
A substantial amount of the committee's revision is a mere
"recodification" of existing provisions of the present Constitu-
tion for better organization. Many provisions were retained
intact by the Committee and a substantial number of sections
were altered only to clarify or modernize the language used. A
number of provisions were considered legislative rather than
constitutional concerns and were, together with the large number
of local amendments to present sections, omitted entirely. Some
recommended changes such as the proposed provision for the
election of the members of the Legislature, merely incorporate
recent Constitutional decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.
On certain specific but important questions, substantive
changes in the fundamental law were made. The Committee's
recommendations concerning urban renewal, the office of Comp-
troller General, and the number of terms a Governor may serve
are among the most significant.
Extensive and basic changes and reorganization were effectu-
ated by the proposals on local government, finance and property
taxation, and, to a lesser degree, the Judicial Department. This
1
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paper will present an article by article summary of these
changes.
II. AnTicLE I-Tn DEcILARPTioi oF RiHr~s
The Committee recommended several changes in the present
Declaration of Rights. Though the changes recommended would
not cause major reform in any present state activity, they are
nonetheless interesting for they attempt to protect the rights of
the people from forms of encroachment not anticipated in 1895.
A. Invasions of Privacy, Searches
To article 1, section 16 of the Constitution of 1895, which con-
tains the same language as the fourth amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States, the Committee would add two
paragraphs. The first of these would protect the right of the
people to be secure from unreasonable invasions of privacy.'
For years South Carolina has recognized the common law tort
action for invasion of privacy.2 Presumably the Committee's
provision is directed solely at state action and thus it would
neither enlarge nor restrict the civil cause of action; however,
it would limit government or government-authorized investiga-
tion or retention of information. But because of the broadness
of the language used (unreasonable invasions of privacy), it is
difficult to say exactly what state practices might be proscribed
by the new provision, which is an apparent invitation to the
South Carolina judiciary to develop a constitutional common
law of privacy. On the federal level, the United States Supreme
Court has been groping for a concept of constitutional privacy
and several recent decisions of that Court perhaps shed some
light on the scope of the proposed new provision.
In Griswold v. Oonnecticut the Court struck down a Con-
necticut anti-birth control statute on the theory that it violated
the privacy of the marital bedroom. This heretofore unknown
constitutionally protected right was derived from the penumbras
of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Since G-riswold
1. COMMITTEE TO MAKE A STUDY OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONsTrUTION
or 1895, FINAL REPORT, Art. 1, § J (1969). (Hereinafter cited as REPORT).
2. The right of privacy action was first acknowledged in South Carolina in
Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169 (1940). The cause
of action is discussed and its elements defined in Meetze v. Associated Press,
230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956). It should be noted, however, that the power
of states to protect the privacy of their citizens is severely limited where the
right to privacy conflicts with the first amendment rights of free speech and
press. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
3. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19701 NOTES
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the Court has not used the penumbral approach to expand the
right of privacy. Indeed, in Katz v. United States4 the Court de-
clined to follow the Grivvold approach. There the petitioner,
who had been convicted of transmitting wagering information by
telephone, argued, inter alia, that the government had violated
his right to privacy by eavesdropping on his telephone conversa-
tion. The Court implied that there is no general constitutional
right to privacy at all.5 It further said that the Constitution pro-
tects an individual's privacy only from governmental interfer-
ence.6
[T]he protection of a person's general right to privacy
-his right to be let alone by other people-is, like the
protection of his property and of his very life, left
largely to the law of the individual states.7
In Staney v. GeorgiaP the appellant was convicted under a
Georgia statute of knowingly possessing obscene material after
federal and state agents found three stagg films while searching
his home for evidence of bookmaking activity. The Court re-
versed the conviction and held that the mere private possession
of obscene material could not constitutionally be made a crime.9
The Court reasoned that, although the first amendment does not
protect obscenity, it does protect the right to receive information
and ideas and that this right to receive takes on added dimen-
sion when exercised in the privacy of one's own home. 10 Perhaps
the language proposed by the Committee is nothing more than a
recognition of the fundamental right described in Stanley-the
"right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from un-
wanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy."-" As pointed
out by the Supreme Court in Katz, "Virtually every govern-
mental action interferes with personal privacy to some degree."' 2
The Committee, as a matter of policy, drew the line between rea-
sonable and unreasonable interference and left it to the courts to
balance the interests of the state against those of the individual.
It also left open the question of whether the right extends only
to state action.
4. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5. Id. at 350.
6. Id. at 350 n.5.
7. Id. at 351.
8. 89 S. Ct. 1243 (1969).
9. Id. at 1247-48.
10. Id. at 1248.
11. Id.
12. 389 U.S. at 350 n.5.
[Vol. 2
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The second addition recommended by the Committee was the
following sentence:
Warrants issued in the execution of laws relating to the
general health, safety, and welfare shall be issued upon
such cause as the General Assembly shall by law deter-
mine.18
The purpose of this provision is to allow the General Assembly
to set standards for the issuance of warrants to be used by offi-
cials in making inspections of the physical condition of private
property where the owner refuses to give his consent. The inclu-
sion of the provision was probably brought about by the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Camara v. MunicipaZ Court
of City and County of Ban Francisco4 where it was held that
building inspectors could not gain access to private property over
the protest of the owner without a warrant issued upon a show-
ing of probable cause. The Court went on to explain, however,
that "probable cause" could take into account the nature of the
search or inspection and that the necessary probable cause would
exist, "if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a
particular dwelling."' 5 Thus, the effect of the provision would
be merely to insure that such searches will not fall within the
general restrictions of the first paragraph of proposed section J
dealing with searches in criminal investigations.
B. Grand Jury Indictment, Double Jeopardy, Self-I crimination
The Committee would make three separate provisions of arti-
cle I, section 17 of the present constitution. The part dealing
with the right to indictment by the grand jury would be slightly
altered. The requirement would be effective only when the pun-
ishment authorized exceded thirty days, instead of two hundred
dollars10 or thirty days. The defendant would also be allowed to
waive presentment to the grand jury. This represents a change
from the position of many courts,-7 possibly ours included,' 8
13. Report, Art. 1, § J. Although the language of the provision is broad
enough to include searches for evidence of criminal activity, the first paragraph
of the article and the fourth and fourteenth amendments make it clear that if
a criminal charge is contemplated, nothing short of probable cause would be
sufficient to justify the issuance of a warrant.
14. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
15. Id. at 538.
16. Article I, section 17 was amended in 1963 to raise the fine permissible
without grand jury indictment from $100 to $200.
17. E.g., Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 164 N.E. 111 (1928).
18. See State v. Hann, 196 S.C. 211, 12 S.E.2d 720 (1940).
1970] NOTES
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that the right to presentment to a grand jury and trial only on
its indictment was not only a personal right but also an expres-
sion of the state's public policy that could not be waived by a
defendant. The double jeopardy and self-incrimination portions
of article I, section 17 would be retained intact.19
C. Jury Trial, Venue
The Committee's proposal on the right to jury trial combined
three sections of the present constitution 20 and made only two
changes in the requirements of those sections. First, the General
Assembly would determine the number of jurors in courts below
the circuit court, whereas now article V, section 22 sets the num-
ber of jurors in inferior courts at six. The second change would
remove the disqualification of those over the age of sixty-five.
2 1
This change would reflect the lengthened life expectancy of the
state's population and certainly a senior citizen in poor health
would be excused from jury duty.
Section 2 of article VI of the Constitution of 1895 would be
transferred into the Declaration of Rights with a minor change.
The right of either party in a civil or criminal case to a change
of venue would be preserved. The requirements that venue be
changed to another county within the same judicial circuit, and
that venue not be changed in criminal cases prior to grand jury
indictment would be deleted. The deletions were dictated by the
possibility that an urban circuit might have only one county and
that criminal defendants who are entitled to a change of venue
might waive presentment to the grand jury.
D. Urban Renewal
The prohibition of article I, section 17 against the taking of
private property for private use without the consent of the
owner was changed by the Committee in the proposed article on
eminent domain. Urban renewal and the taking of private prop-
erty for resale would be allowed under the conditions stated
there.22 Thus, the rule of Edens v. City of Columbia Housing
Authority23 that land taken for resale to private parties is taken
for private use and therefore forbidden by article I, section 17,
would be changed and South Carolina would be in accord with
19. REPORT, Art. I, § L.
20. S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 18, art. I, § 25, art. V, § 22.
21. REPORT, Art. I, § N.
22. REPORT, Art. XI, § E.
23. 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956).
[Vol. 22
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all other states in permitting urban renewal projects and would
cease to be the only state in which the practice is not generally
permissible in clearing slum areas. Heretofore, several local
amendments to article I, section 17 have been passed to permit
specific urban renewal projects. A general change such as that
proposed by the Committee would make such local amendments
unnecessary.
E. ProceduraZ Due Process in Administrative Hearings
The only new section that the committee recommended con-
tained the following language:
No person shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi-
judicial decision of an administrative agency affecting
private rights except on due notice and opportunity to
be heard; nor shall he be subject to the same official for
both prosecution and adjudication; nor shall he be de-
prived of liberty or property unless by a mode or pro-
cedure prescribed by the General Assembly, and he shall
have in such instances the right to judicial review.
24
Article I, section 5 of the South Carolina Constitution and the
fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion provide substantial protection in assuring due process of
law.25 In light of the increasing responsibilities and powers of
governmental agencies, the Committee's recommendation, which
would provide broad and clearly stated protection from arbi-
trary or illegal administrative rulings, should be a welcome
addition to the Declaration of Rights.
III. Amw~cim II--SnMACM AND ELECTIONS
The present requirement that electors be state citizens and 21
years of age would remain unchanged. 26 In accordance with the
recent trend elsewhere,27 the residence requirements for voting
in federal and state elections would be shortened to six months
residence in the state, three months in the county, and a one-
month residence in the precinct 28 from the present requirements
24. REPORT, Art. I, § W.
25. E.g., Shealy v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 131 S.C. 144, 125 S.E. 622 (1924).
26. Only Georgia, Kentucky, Alaska, and Hawaii have a minimum voting
age of less than 21 years. CouNcIL oF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE Boox OF THE
STATES 1968-69, at 30 (1968).
27. Id. at 19.
28. REPORT, Art. II, § D.
1970]
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss1/5
SoU'rH CAROLINA LAw RzVIEW
of one year, six months and three months, as set by the 1963
amendment to article IIH, section 4. The qualification for munici-
pal electors would be made the same as for state electors with
the additional requirement of one month's residence within the
municipality,29 eliminating the present discrepancy resulting
from the requirement of four months' residence within the cor-
porate limits.80
The Committee recommended change in the present registra-
tion requirement that one must either pass a literacy test or own
and have paid taxes on property assessed at more than $300.31
It would provide that the General Assembly may establish a
literacy test by statute.82 It would further require that the Gen-
eral Assembly disqualify by law, persons convicted of "serious
crimes" and those mentally incompetent. But it would allow the
Legislature to provide that the disqualification for conviction of
crime be removed at some point subsequent to the individual's
release from prison.83 Article II, section 6 now requires disquali-
fication upon conviction of any of an assortment of named
crimes and that disqualification can be removed only by pardon
of the Governor. 4 It has been argued convincingly that per-
manent disenfranchisement upon conviction of crime is neither
necessary nor wise in the case of persons who have been
rehabilitated.
The details providing for the registration of voters would be
left to the General Assembly. The proposed constitution would
require only that the period of registration should not be less
than 10 years, that there be provision made for registration
every year, and that the registration lists be public.35 This would
allow the General Assembly to determine the time of closing of
29. REPORT, Art. II, § E.
30. S.C. Coxsr. Art II, § 12.
31. S.C. CONST. Art. II, § 4(d).
32. REPORT, Art. II, § F. The literacy test is still considered a legitimate
control of suffrage, both in state and national elections, so long as it is not used
to discriminate. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). Louisiana v. United
States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) indicated that any test provided by the General
Assembly should explicitly state the standard required leaving little to the
discretion of the registrar. In Gaston County v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 1720
1969), a case decided under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973
1965), the Court said that a literacy test could result in discrimination where
Negroes had been required to attend inferior schools.
33. REPORT, Art. II, § G.
34. See Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d dr. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968), where a New York statute requiring permanent
disqualification on conviction of certain crimes successfully withstood an equal
protection argument.
35. REPORT, Art. II, § H.
[Vol. 2"2
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the registration books, 36 the composition and function of the
election boards,3 7 and the status of the registration certificate, 8
all of which the Committee considered legislative rather than
constitutional concerns.3 9 Article II, section 5, providing for the
right to appeal denial of registration to the Court of Common
Pleas, would be altered slightly by giving a right of appeal to
any court of record. 40
The Committee also recommended that a general mandate be
given to the General Assembly to provide for the proper func-
tioning of the election process. 41 That section would simply make
providing for a sound election process a constitutional duty of
the General Assembly.
IV. AnTiicr III-Tns I.QisLATivmr DEPARTmENT
A. Apportionment
Since the decisions of the Supreme Court in Reynolds v.
Sims 42 and Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colo-
rado,43 apportionment has been a very difficult political problem
in South Carolina as well as in most other states. In drafting
its recommendation on the subject, the Committee did not at-
tempt to formulate a constitutional solution to the political
problem. Rather it altered the present provisions sufficiently to
conform with federal requirements, leaving to the Legislature
the determination of the method in which the required periodic
reapportionment should be effected.
Thus the Committee did not have to make extensive change
in the present provisions concerning the House of Representa-
tives. The present membership of the House, set at 124 by article
III, section 3 and the requirement of article I, section 2 and
article III, section 3-that representatives be apportioned by
population-would be retained. The requirement that each
county constitute an election district 44 was altered to allow the
Legislature to provide for election districts not made up solely of
36. S.C. CoNsT. Art. II, § 11.
37. S.C. CoNsT. Art. II, § 8.
38. S.C. CoNsT. Art. II, § 4(f).
39. S.C. CoNsT. Art. II, § 4(b).
40. REPORT, Art. II, § I. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
Lack of an established method for appealing denial of registration was a factor
in finding of unconstitutionality of election laws.
41. REPORT, Art II, § J.
42. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
43. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
44. S.C. CONST. Art. III § 3.
19701 NOTES
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one county so long as the district was a compact and contiguous
territory.4 The Committee's proposal is that only as far as possi-
ble under the federal decisions should each county have at least
one representative, 40 rather than the present absolute requirement
that each county have at least one representative. 47 Although one
purpose of the change in the provision on House election districts
was to allow them to be enlarged,48 the recommendation would at
the same time permit a reduction in size of the districts and the
creation of up to 124 such districts.
In its provisions regarding the composition of the Senate, the
Committee retained the four year term of office and the forty-
six senator limit on membership implicit49 in article IIM, sec-
tion 6.1° The recommended provision allows the General Assem-
bly to create any number of senatorial election districts.51 No
provision was made as to the residence of senators within a par..
ticular county in an election district; the only requirement is
that senators reside within the district in which elected.52 Pre-
sumably methods of spreading the senators among the counties
in the district such as the "numbered seat"5 would continue to
be legitimate.
Both the House and the Senate would be subjected to the
requirement, now applicable only to the House, of reapportion-
ment within the first year following the publication of the
decennial census. The new apportionment would take effect in
the next following election.
4
The present provision for filling vacancies in the House and
Senate would be changed sufficiently to allow the General As-
sembly to determine by law the procedure to be followed when
less than one year remains in the term when the vacancy occurs.55
45. REor, Art. III, § C.
46. REPORT, Art. III,§ D.
47. S.C. CONST. Art. III, § 4. But see O'Shields v. McNair, 254 F. Supp. 708
(D.S.C. 1966).
48. See REPORT, Art. III, § D (Comment).
49. For discussion of the effect of Article III, § 6, in limiting Senate mem-
bership subsequent to Reytolds see O'Shields v. McNair, 254 F. Supp. 708
(D.S.C. 1966); State ex rel. McLeod v. West, 249 S.C. 243, 153 S.E2d 892
1967).
50. REPORT, Art. II, §§ E, F.
51. REPORT, Art. III, § F.
52. REPORT, Art. III, § G. It is substantially the same provision as the present
article III, section 7, as amended in 1967.
53. S.C. CODE Arm. §§ 23-281 to -285 (Supp. 1968).
54. S.C. CoNsT. Art III, §§ 3, 5; Report, Art. III, § H.
55. S.C. CONST. Art. III, § 25; Report, Art. III, § L
[Vol. 22
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B. Veto Power
The Committee would include the provision establishing the
veto power of the Governor in the article on the Legislature with
only two minor changes. It would make clear that the Governor's
item veto applied only to bills appropriating money and would
extend the time in which the Governor may exercise his veto
from three to seven days. 6
C. Legislative Election of the Comptroller General
To aid the Legislature in budgeting and controlling the ex-
penditure of state funds, a constitutional change in the status
and function of the office of Comptroller General was recom-
mended. The Comptroller General would be elected by the Legis-
lature and would be responsible to it, his office functioning as
a legislative agency rather than an executive one." Whereas the
present function of the office is primarily pre-auditing or insur-
ing that the expense is authorized before payment is made,"8 the
Committee's recommendation would give the office the responsi-
bility of post-auditing to insure that accounts balanced and
funds were properly spent. The Comptroller General would also
perform such other duties as the Legislature prescribed. It was
felt that the Legislature, which is responsible for appropriations,
should have its own agency to give advice and insure that the
funds were properly spent. This change would conform with a
recent trend which saw Colorado, Kentucky, Wisconsin, and
South Dakota transfer post-auditing responsibility to a legisla-
tive agency in the years 1966 and 1967.59 Some change in the
office of Auditor would be indicated. He presently has responsi-
bility for post-auditing and making annual reports to the Gov-
ernor,60 which reports may then be sent to the General As-
sembly.6
1
V. ARTcim IV-THE ExEounvE DEPAnTmET
As the services provided by state governments have expanded,
the duties and responsibilities of the chief executives of many
56. S.C. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 23; Report, Art. 3, § U.
57. The State, Oct 13, 1967, at 10A, Col. 1.
58. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-841 to -864 (1962).
59. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BooNc OF THE STATES 1968-69, at 30
(1968).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-882 (1962).
61. S.C. CODE AN. § 1-883 (1962).
1970] NOTES
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states have shown corresponding increases. 62 Accordingly, the
Committee's provisions strengthened the Governor's office to aid
him in meeting these responsibilities.
The first substantial change would be the deletion of the pres-
ent prohibition against a governor's succeeding himself. The
Committee's proposal limiting the number of terms a governor
can serve is the same as the twenty-second amendment's limita-
tion on the number of terms a president may serve. It would
allow two full terms provided the candidate has not served more
than two years of his predecessor's term.63 The change would
also be effective for the office of Lieutenant Governor."
Several changes were recommended in the present provisions
concerning succession to the offices of Governor and Lieutenant
Governor. A vacancy in the office of Lieutenant Governor
would be filled immediately by the election of a Senator by a
majority of the Senate. 5 Therefore, that office could be vacant
for only a short period and any vacancy in the office of Gov-
ernor would always be filled by the Lieutenant Governor.66 In
the event of temporary absence or disability of the Governor,
the Lieutenant Governor would exercise only emergency pow-
ers67 as opposed to the requirement of article IV, section 9 of the
present constitution that he perform the duties of the Governor
in that situation.
A new provision would give the supreme court original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the absence or disability of
the Governor or Lieutenant Governor s to avoid the possibility
that an incapacitated man might hold office for an extended
period of time.
The Governor would retain his present power to grant re-
prives and to commute death sentences, but the constitutional
material establishing and regulating the Parole Board 9 would
62. See GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION AND Gov-
ERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION, STATE BY STATE SUMMARY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION AND GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION-JANUARY 1, 1963 TO JUNE 30,
1967, PART 11 (1968).
63. REPORT, Art. IV, § C. Louisiana (1966), Oklahoma (1966), Missouri
(1965), and Pennsylvania (1967) have recently adopted constitutional amend-
ments to allow governors to hold two consecutive terms.
64. REPORT, Art. IV, § H.
65. REPORT, Art. IV, § I.
66. REPORT, Art. IV, § K.
67. Id.
68. REPORT, Art IV, § L.
69. S.C. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 11.
[Vol. 2
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be deleted, leaving its organization and function for the deter-
mination of the General Assembly.
70
Article IV, section 12 of the constitution of 1895, contains the
following language concerning the Governor: "He shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed in mercy." The meaning
of the provision has not been explained by our court, but its
wording and position following the section giving the Governor
power to grant reprives or commute death sentences suggest
that it dealt with his exercise of that power; the section was once
cited by our court in explaining that mercy rested with neither
the trial nor appellate courts but with the Governor3 1 The
Committee has changed the section by deleting the words "with
mercy" and adding a second sentence that would give the Gov-
ernor direct access to the courts either to enforce compliance
with or to enjoin violation of "any constitutional or legislative
power or duty by any officer, department or agency of the
state,172 excepting the General Assembly or supreme court.
This section would give needed authority and control to the
Governor.
VI. ARTicLE V-TH. JuniciA. DEPARTmENT
Recent trends in the reformation of state judicial systems have
been toward the establishment of uniform systems and the aboli-
tion of special courts serving geographic areas.7 3 The Committee
recommendations on the judicial system are in keeping with that
trend.
Only the supreme court and the circuit court retain constitu-
tional status. County and other inferior courts would be created
and regulated by general law. The jurisdiction of inferior courts
would no longer necessarily be limited to one county and there
would be no constitutional provision concerning the organiza-
tion, powers, or jurisdiction of any such inferior courts except
that the General Assembly provide for them by general law
74
and that the Chief Justice be administrative head of all courts
of the state.75 This approach would result in the deletion of
70. REPORT, Art IV, § 11.
71. State v. Floyd, 174 S.C. 288, 330, 177 S.E. 375, 392 (1934).
72. REPORT, Art IV, § 0.
73. See Dobbs, Court Reform-Suggested Legislative Action under the 1962
Constitutional Amendment, 42 N.C.L. REv. 858 (1964); Overton, The Judicial
System in Tennessee and Potentialities for Reform, 32 TENN. L. REv. 501, 541
(1965).
74. REPORT, Art. V, § A.
75. REPORT, Art. V, § D.
NOTES1970]
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present provisions and amendments concerning county courts,7 6
magistrates,7 7 and magistrates courts. 78 The present provision
leaving the status of probate courts to legislative determination 9
would be retained.80 Article V, section I now gives the legislature
power to create inferior courts but does not require that it be
done by general law or that the courts so created be administered
by the Chief Justice.8l
The Committee recommended that the size,82 method of selec-
tion of judges," and quorum of the supreme court remain
unchanged. s4 The provision of article V, section 12 dealing
with an en bane court would be eliminated. The supreme court
would make rules governing the practice and procedure in all
courts, and the Chief Justice would be administrative head of
all courts. However, the Chief Justice would be authorized to
appoint an administrator of the courts and such assistants as
might be necessary to assist him in the administration of the
courts."5
Selections 15 and 18 of article V, which gave civil and crim-
inal jurisdiction respectively to the court of common pleas and
the court of general sessions, would be combined into one section
granting jurisdiction to the circuit court.86 The jurisdiction
granted there would extend to all cases, civil and criminal, and
would effect no change in the present original or appellate civil
jurisdiction of the circuit court. The circuit court's original
criminal jurisdiction, however, would be enlarged to include
offenses that are presently in the exclusive jurisdiction of the
magistrates.8 7 The Committee's proposal also would allow the
76. S.C. CorxsT. Art. V, §§ 1, IA.
77. S.C. CoxsT. Art. V, § 20.
78. S.C. CONST. Art. V, §§ 21, 23.
79. S.C. CONST. Art. V, § 19; Greenfield v. Greenfield, 245 S.C. 604, 141
S.E.2d 920 (1965).
80. REPORT, Art. V, § H.
81. The requirement of the consent of the voters for establishment of a county
court would also be eliminated.
82. Twenty-four states have seven members on their highest court and seven-
teen including South Carolina, have five. At least nineteen states have now
established intermediate appellate courts. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
THE Boon oF THE STATES 1968-69, at 103 (1968).
83. For a listing of the methods for selecting judges in each state, see COuN-
CIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BooK OF THE STATES 1968-69, at 110-11.
84. REPORT, Art. V, §§ B, C.
85. REPORT, Art. V, § D. During the years 1966-67, Idaho, Oklahoma, Utah,
Vermont, and Louisiana created administrative offices for the courts. That
brought to thirty-five the number of states which had such offices. COUNCIL
Or STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1968-69, at 103 (1968).
86. REPORT, Art. V, § G. The same merger of the civil and criminal courts
is expressed in section A of article V of the report.
87. See State v. Castleman, 219 S.C 136, 64 S.E2d 250 (1951).
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General Assembly to provide for direct appeal from the county
courts to the supreme court in cases of riot, assault and lar-
ceny.8 The constitutional requirements of two terms of civil and
criminal court in each county each year 89 would also be deleted.
The present number of judicial circuits would be made a con-
stitutional limit. However, the General Assembly would have
authority to create up to five additional at large judgeships, the
judges to be assigned by the Chief Justice to those circuits in
which they are needed.90
To provide a means for the removal of a judge from office
because of inability to perform his duties or for misconduct,9'
the Committee suggested that the supreme court be given the
power to remove any judge after a hearing for misconduct or
persistent failure to perform his duties and to retire any judge
for permanent disability interfering with the performance of
his duty.
92
The present provisions concerning the clerks of court, solici-
tors, sheriffs, and coroners would be deleted in favor of a provi-
sion directing the General Assembly to provide for sufficient
officials to enforce the law and carry on the administration of
the courts. The provision makes it clear, however, that the Attor-
ney General should have some degree of control over solicitors
for it gives him authority to supervise all prosecutions. 3
VII. ARTxcx VIi-FnAwcE, TAxArio, AwD BoD IxDEBTmDNsS
A. Property Taxes
The South Carolina system of property taxation has been the
object of considerable criticism in recent years.94 The Committee
recommended basic change in the present system. Constitutional
88. REPORT, Art. V, § M.
89. S.C. CoNsr. Art. V, § 16.
90. REPORT, Art. V, § I.
91. A number of states have constitutionally established procedures for the
removal of judges without endangering the independence of the judiciary.
CouNCIL OF STATE GoVERNRIENTS, THE Boor OF THE STATES 1968-69, at 104
(1968).
92. REPORT, Art. V, § M. The California approach to the problem is to estab-
lish a commission composed of members of the judiciary and others to hear
complaints about judges and it is the plan most often copied. See CAL. CONST.
Art. VI, §§ 8, 18; CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 68-701 to -755 (Supp. 1968). See also
Traynor, Who Can Best Judge the Judges, 53 VA. L. REv. 1266 (1967);
Frankel, Removal of Judges: California Tackles an Old Problem, 49 A.B.A.J.
166 (1963).
93. REPORT, Art. V, § P.
94. E.g., P. ALGEA, THE ROLE OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA INr THE
TAXATION OF PROPERTY (1965).
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provisions now require that the General Assembly provide for
one assessment of property for taxation,95 that the assessment
be based on the actual or market value of the property,96 and
that the rate be uniform and equal within the subdivision levy-
ing the tax.97 A substantial reason for the dissatisfaction with
the present system is not its constitutional foundation but rather
the inequities resulting from its administration: as the foreword
of the Third Annual Report of the Tax Study Commission said,
"The property tax, as spelled out by constitutional provision
and by statute, bears no resemblance to that actually in exist-
ence."
9 8
Assessment of the personal property of manufacturing indus-
tries, of merchants' inventories, equipment, furniture and fix-
tures, and of public utilities, is made by the South Carolina Tax
Commission. The owners of these properties bear a dispropor-
tionate share of the tax burden because the state's assessment
ratio is different from the assessment ratio of the county that
assesses other property therein. Although the Legislature has
acted to reduce the assessment ratio on these properties,99 a
discrepancy inevitably results so long as the assessment ratios
used by the various counties are not uniform.100 Further inequi-
ties arise from the fact that within many counties, the assess-
ments are not uniform.10'
Therefore, the Committee would retain the requirements that
the General Assembly should provide for the assessment of all
property not exempted from taxation by the constitution, 102 and
that the one assessment be used for all levies.'0 3 It would also
require that the assessment rate should apply uniformly through-
out the state,10 4 clarifying the requirement of article 1, section
10, and reversing the interpretation of that section that it re-
quired uniformity only within the subdivision levying the tax.'0 5
95. S.C. CoNsT. Art. X, §§ 1, 13; S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-1503 (1962).
96. S.C. CoxsT. Art. 1, § 6, Art. III, § 29, Art. X, § 5(9); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 65-1648 (1962).
97. S.C. CoxsT. Art. X, § 1; Smith v. Robertson, 210 S.C. 99, 41 S.E2d 631
(1947) ; Nettles v. Cantwell, 112 S.C. 24, 99 S.E. 765 (1919).
98. P. ALGFA, mpra note 94, at 77.
99. S.C. CuDE ANN. §§ 65-1667 to -1668 (Supp. 1968).
100. For a sample of 1961 county assessment ratios see P. ALGEA, pra note
88 at 67.
101. Id.; Discrimination by local officials in making the assessment, so long
as the discrimination is not required or sanctioned by the statute, does not make
the tax void. Fuller v. Payne, 96 S.C. 471, 81 S.E. 176 (1914).
102. REPORT, Art. VI, § A.
103. REPORT, Art. VI, § D.
104. REPORT, Art. VI, § A.
105. Smith v. Robertson, 210, S.C. 99, 41 S.E.2d 631 (1947).
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The second major change in property taxation would be the
removal of the requirement that assessment be determined from
actual or market value. The Committee would allow the General
Assembly to establish classifications of real or personal property
for which different bases might be used.10 6 For example, under
this provision, the General Assembly might determine to assess
rural land according to its market value as is presently required,
or it could establish some other standard such as the value that
the land has for agricultural, horticultural, or forest use.107 The
use value basis of assessment would be much preferred by prop-
erty owners on the fringes of metropolitan areas who feel that
the assessment of their property at its sale value constitutes a
hardship when they use it for farming or growing trees. On the
other hand, the lower tax burden imposed on such property
would encourage withholding it from its best use and contribute
to the rising price of land required for industrial and residen-
tial purposes. 08
The Committee would substantially retain the classifications
of property presently exempted from taxation by article X,
section 4109 and would permit the Legislature to establish fur-
ther exemptions by general law." 0
The Committee would also include a provision to insure that
political subdivisions may be authorized to assess and collect
taxes so long as the tax is uniform within the subdivision. The
requirement of uniformity would not, however, prohibit special
levies on property receiving special benefit."'
B. Bonds
The changes recommended by the Committee for the regula-
tion of finance and bonded indebtedness are a complete de-
parture from the present provisions. Article 19, section 11 now
forbids increase in the public debt of the state without the
consent of two-thirds of the electors voting on the question.
Millions of dollars worth of bonds, however, have been issued
by the state since the ratification of the constitution of 1895,
106. REPORT, Art. VI, § A.
107. See, Dat. CoDe ANN. § 9-8330-31 (Vol. 4, Supp. 1968).
108. For an extensive system of classification see hfNNt. STAT. § 273.13
(1967).
109. RPoRT, Art. VI, § B. Property of political subdivisions, schools,
asylums, libraries, churches, parsonages and burying grounds is presently
constitutionally exempt from taxation.
110. REPoRT, Art. VI, § C.
111. REPoRT, Art. VI, § F.
1970]
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without such approval by the voters. In State em,. ele. Richards
V. Moorer, 2 the supreme court developed the special fund doc-
trine, which permitted bonds to be issued and obligations in-
curred by the state so long as annual revenue, other than that
from property taxes, was sufficient to make the annual principal
and interest payments required for the bonds.' 3 If that require-
ment was met, the obligation did not constitute a "public debt"
within the meaning of article X, section 11.114 Subsequently the
court held that so long as the special fund was sufficient, the
fact that the bonds were secured by the full faith, credit and
taxing power of the state did not make them "public debt." 15
The Committee would delete the ineffectual requirement of
consent of two-thirds of the people. In its stead, it would provide
that the Legislature be able to authorize by simple majority vote
the issuance of bonds in an amount equal to twice the average
of the amount of tax collections" in each of the three preceding
years, and amounts in excess of that on the approval of two-
thirds of the members of each house. Further, all obligations
must be secured by the full faith, credit and taxing power of the
state, in order to prevent the issuance of bonds secured by new
special funds in circumvention of the new policy."1 7 In light of
the court's decision in Craw ord v. Johnson,118 it is questionable
whether the language of the Committee's provision is suffi-
ciently specific to prevent special bond issues. However, the
Committee's use of the term "indebtedness" rather than "public
debt," plus the requirement that bonds be issued within the
authorization and limitation of the section, should ensure that
the effect intended will be realized.
C. Bonds of Subdivisions
Unlike the present provisions imposing only procedural limita-
tions on the state's increasing its bonded indebtedness, the present
provisions on the indebtedness by subdivisions limit the amount
112. 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E. 269 (1929); See Sinkler, Constitutional Limita-
tion on Public Finance in South Carolina, 3 S.C.L.Q. 303 (1951).
113. For discussion of the sufficiency of the special fund see Arthur v.
Byrnes, 224 S.C. 51, 77 S.E.2d 311 (1953).
114. State ex rel. Richards v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 490-92, 150 S.E.2d 269,
281-82 (1929).
115. Crawford v. Johnston, 177 S.C. 399, 181 S.E. 476 (1935).
116. Total state tax collection for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, was
$377,158,371.39, for the preceding year $363,002,307.87. 1968 S.C. TAx Comm.
ANN. REP'T 7.
117. REPoRr, Art. X, § M (Comment).
118. 177 S.C. 399, 181 S.E. 476 (1935).
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of indebtedness that can be incurred,119 the purposes for which
any indebtedness may be incurred,1 20 and require approval by a
majority of the voters.1
2 '
The original debt limitations proved impractical and soon
were largely undermined by numerous amendments and judi-
cial decisions. The fifteen percent limit on the aggregate indebt-
edness of all subdivisions in which the property was situate sus-
tained a series of reverses by the court, from which it might have
been argued that the limitation had been effectively nullified.
22
However, Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer District 23 held
that the fifteen percent limit must be observed by a special service
district established to build an auditorium. Thus, although it can
be said that the limitation does not apply in several situations, it
is still a factor in situations not within the exceptions. A constitu-
tional amendment to article VII, section 7, removed the limits on
municipal corporations in incurring indebtedness to purchase or
maintain waterworks, or sewerage or lighting plants. Numerous
local amendments have removed both debt limitations for specific
projects in designated areas.'
2 4
Article VIII, sections 3 and 6 specify that cities may levy
taxes or incur indebtedness only for public and corporate pur-
poses. Counties and townships, however, could only be author-
ized to levy a tax or issue bonds for the specific purposes stated
in article X, section 6. The court has literally followed that
provision,'125 the purpose of which was to weaken home rule by
denying power to the counties. 26
119. S.C. CONST. Art. VIII, § 7, Art. X, § 5. Article X, section 5, provides
that the total bonded debt of any subdivision shall not exceed eight percent of
the assessed value of the property therein and that where there are two or
more subdivisions extending over the same territory, the aggregate debt on the
territory may not exceed fifteen percent of the assessed value of the property
in the territory.
120. S.C. CoNsT. Art. X, § 6.
121. S.C. CoxsT. Art VIII, § 7.
122. Lancaster School Dist. v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 64 S.C. 545, 42 S.E.
998 (1902) (state indebtedness not to be included in computing aggregate);
Elliot v. Heyward, 127 S.C. 468, 121 S.E. 257 (1924) (county could issue full
8% regardless of article X, § 5 15% limit) ; Banks v. School Dist., 129 S.C.
218, 123 S.E. 834 (1924) (school district not bound by 15% limit); Winstead
v. Williams, 132 S.C. 365, 128 S.E. 46 (1925) (city not bound by 15o limit);
Berry v. Milliken, 234 S.C. 518, 109 S.E.2d 354 (1959) (airport district not
subject to 15% limit). But see, Sinkler, Constitutional Limitations on Public
Finance in South Carolina, 3 S.C.L.Q. 303, 322 (1951).
123. 211 S.C. 77, 44 S.E2d 88 (1947).
124. S.C. CoNsT. Art VII, § 7 (1-51); art X, § 5 (2-135).
125. B.g., Powell v. Thomas, 214 S.C. 376, 52 S.E.2d 782 (1949).
126. Sinkler, Constitutional Limitations on Public Finance in South Carolina,
3 S.C.L.Q. 303, 310 (1951).
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Although no procedural limitations were placed on county
increase of public debt, article VIII, section 71 requires the
consent of a majority of the electors within the city before
municipalities can incur indebtedness. The same section also
requires the creation of a sinking fund for retirement of bonds
at their maturity.
The Committee provided for both counties and municipalities
in the same provision. It would allow all subdivisions to incur
bonded indebtedness secured by the full faith and credit of the
subdivision for such purposes and on such terms as the General
Assembly might prescribe. There would be no limit on the
indebtedness. The governing body of the subdivision could issue
bonds, provided the indebtedness did not exceed the amount of
taxes and licenses collected in the three previous years. Amounts
in excess of that amount would have to be approved by the elec-
tors. The requirement of a "sinking fund" would be eliminated
but the Committee would provide that bonds must mature within
thirty years. 127 Thus the Committee would provide much simpler
and less restrictive regulation of finances for local governments.
VIII. AnTioIx VII-LOCAL GOERMENT
The Committee felt that broad and basic changes were re-
quired in the constitutional provisions on local government,128
and consequently, it has largely rewritten the present provisions
on county and city government combining them into one article,
in the hope of providing the framework for functional local
government.
The Committee would constitutionally limit the maximum
number of counties in the state to the present forty-six. 29 It
would delete the provisions of article VII, sections 1, 2, 3, 4 and
5 concerning the creation of new counties, but would retain the
part of article VII, section 10 providing for a merger of counties
with the approval of a majority of those voting in a referendum
on the question.'30 Should two counties merge, presumably an-
other county could be created on any terms the General Assem-
bly might formulate.
The Constitution of 1895 made no provision regulating the
form or power of county government. Article VII, section 11 is
127. REPORT, Art. VI, § N.
128. REPORT 6.
129. REPORT, Art. VII, § C.
130. REPORT, Art. VII, § D. The section further provides that the election
shall be called at the request of the counties' governing bodies or on the peti-
tion of ten percent of the voters in each county.
[Vol. 22
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said to have given the General Assembly complete control of the
government and internal affairs of counties,131 and to have re-
laxed the requirement of article II, section 34(9), which pro-
hibits the enactment of a special law where a general one could
be made effective.132 As a practical matter, the General Assem-
bly can grant to the counties or to any one county "power to
discharge such governmental functions as it thinks proper to
promote prosperity, safety, convenience, health, and common
good of the county's inhabitants." 33 Moreover, the General
Assembly apparently would have the power under the present
constitution to prescribe any system of county government it
might choose. However, should it provide for county govern-
ment, the functioning of the county government would be re-
stricted by the prohibition against delegation of legislative
power.'3 4 For example, it was once held that police powers could
not be delegated to counties.135 This was later restricted in
Ruggels v. Padgett('3 to proscribe only the creation or definition
of crimes or misdemeanors by the local government; the local
government could designate sanctions short of criminal prosecu-
tion to advance the public welfare.
The proposed revision directs the General Assembly to estab-
lish up to five classes of counties. 137 The General Assembly
would be required to set up a form, or alternate forms, of gov-
ernment for each class of county and to establish the powers and
duties of government in each class of county. 38 Special laws
applicable to less than all of the counties in a class would be
prohibited'3 9 and the present provision permitting special provi-
sions in general laws 40 would be deleted.141 Further, the limit of
five that would be placed on the number of classes of counties 142
would effectively foreclose the creation of a separate class each
time a problem unique to one county arose. Therefore, the coun-
131. See, e.g., Reese v. Hinnant, 187 S.C. 474, 198 S.E. 403 (1938).
132. See [1962-63] S.C. Atty Gen. Annual Rep. 93.
133. Park v. Greenwood County, 174 S.C. 35, 176 S.E. 870 (1934).
134. See Note, An Analysis of Delegation of Legislative Power in South
Carolina, 14 S.C.L. REv. 510 (1962).
135. Owens v. Smith, 216 S.C. 382, 58 SE.2d 332 (1950).
136. 240 S.C. 494, 126 S.E.2d 533 (1962).
137. REPORT, Art VII, § G.
138. This would take the form of a comprehensive act on the subject of
county government, similar to the Municipal Corporations Act. S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 47-1 to -1711 (1962). The Committee's proposal here is similar to S.C.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 dealing with municipal government.
139. REPRT, Art. VII, § H.
140. S.C. CONST. Art. III, § 34(10).
141. REPORT, Art. III, § BB.
142. RsRa, Art. VII, § G.
1970]
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss1/5
SouTH CAROLIA LAW REviRW
ties would have to have functional governments with substantial
power to deal with their local problems.
The Committee's treatment of municipal government is more
comprehensive than article VIII of the present constitution. The
requirement of article VIII, section 2, that the majority of elec-
tors residing in an area to be incorporated consent to that incor-
poration, which was the subject of recent controversy in North
Charleston, 4 3 would be deleted in favor of a provision authoriz-
ing the General Assembly to fix the criteria and procedure for
incorporation or annexation by general law. 44
The Committee recommended the same classification 45 and
administration by general law'4 6 for municipalities that it
recommended for counties. However, those provisions would not
constitute a major change for article VIII, section 1 and the
Munioipal Clorporations Act 147 now require and provide sub-
stantially the type of municipal government proposed by the
Committee.
The Committee's most substantial changes in the area of
municipal government are in its provision requiring the General
Assembly to provide a procedure by which municipalities may
adopt a charter and exercise home rule. 48 The provision would
have the General Assembly determine the class or classes of mu-
nicipalties eligible for home rule and no charter would become ef-
fective until approved by the electors voting on the question. 49
The home rule referred to by the Committee is the right of the
people to establish a government in a form they may choose and
to have that government attend to all matters of purely local con-
cern without interference by the state. 50 The city's charter, which
would be approved by the people, would correspond to the state
or federal constitution and would designate the form of govern-
ment to be used as well as processes for amending the charter. No
charter could contain provisions inconsistent with the constitu-
143. Clay v Thornton, 169 S.E.2d 617 (S.C. 1969).
144. REPORT, Art. VII, § I.
145. REPORT, Art. VII, § J.
146. REPORT, Art. VII, § K.
147. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1 to -1711 (1962).
148. Recent developments in local government throughout the country have
increased home rule of cities and counties. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNmENTS,
THE BooK oF THE STATES 1968-69, at 257 (1968).
149. REPORT, Art. VII, § L.
150. E.g., People v. Johnson, 34 Colo. 143, 86 P. 233 (1905).
[Vol. 2.
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tion or with general laws relating to certain subjects of statewide
concern.""'
The Committee would also provide that counties with a popu-
lation density greater than one hundred per square mile'52 could
merge with their political subdivisions to form a single unit of
government.153 This unification could take place only with the
consent of the people as evidenced in a referendum that the
General Assembly would be required to call at the request of the
county's governing body or on the petition of ten percent of the
electors. After consolidation the county could then adopt a char-
ter and achieve home rule.
The Committee's proposal on local government also contains
a provision requiring that the constitution and all laws relating
to local government be liberally construed in favor of the local
government and that the powers specifically granted by the con-
stitution to local governments include those fairly implied.15 4
The purpose of the section is to effect the abrogation of the
Dillon rule.15  The Dillon rule reasoned that since local govern-
ments were agencies of the state deriving all their powers from
it, those powers should be strictly construed against the local
government.
CONCLUSION
In these first seven articles, the Committee dealt with
areas of considerable difficulty and recommended simpler and
more flexible treatment of them. That same approach was con-
tinued throughout the draft. The latter articles would bring
about some important changes in such areas as the composition
of the State Board of Education, 58 the selection of the State
Superintendent of Education 57 and the Adjutant General, 58
eminent domain for slum clearance, 5 9 and procedures for adopt-
ing a new constitution. 60 In its article entitled "Miscellaneous
151. REPORT, Art VII, §§ L, M. The matters of state-wide concern with
respect to which general law of the state would control are listed in section 0
of Article VII of the report.
152. Anderson, Charleston, Florence, Greenville, Richland, Spartanburg,
Sumter, and York Counties presently meet this requirement
153. REPORT, Art. VII, § M.
154. REPoRT, Art. VII, § R.
155. 1 Dillon, COMMNTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 237 (5th ed. 1911).
156. REPORT, Art. VIII, § A.
157. REPORT, Art. VIII, § B.
158. REPORT, Art. XII, § C.
159. REPORT, Art XI, § E.
160. REPORT, Art XV, § D.
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Matters" the Committee retained the present constitutional pro-
visions on divorce, lotteries, and alcoholic beverages.' o ' Perhaps
the most striking feature of several of the last ten articles pro-
posed by the committee is their brevity. The proposed article on
corporations has only two sections as opposed to the present 21;
to education four sections were devoted as opposed to twelve;
and charitable and penal institutions were covered in two sections
rather than the nine presently devoted to them. This reduction
in the constitutional treatment of these areas was accompanied
by broad constitutional mandates to the General Assembly to
provide for their sound regulation.16 2
An amendment to the constitution in 1969,163 as recommended
by the Committee,164 provides that for the years 1970 and 1972,
amendment to the Constitution may be made article by article,
whereas formerly item by item amendment was required. The
Committee recognized that serious problems might arise should
the voters approve some articles and disapprove others. 65 The
committee therefore, attempted to make each article complete and
independent of the others,166 but some articles contain material
previously found in several different articles. The 1969 amend-
ment setting up the article by article procedure provides, how-
ever, that after approval by a majority of the voters, the article
must again be approved by the Legislature. Thus, should some
articles be rejected by the voters, the legislature could avoid
these problems by not approving articles that are dependent on
the articles that were rejected by the voters.
J'Ams A. SPRUILL
161. REPORT, Art. XVI.
162. REPORT, Art. VIII, § C; REPORT, Art IX §§ A-B; REPORT, Art. X,
§§ A-B.
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